THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE IN MODERN NIGERIA:
Ending it, Mending it or Reinventing it? - 5

[Preamble ]   [Formation of the Caliphate ]   [Foundation of the Caliphate ]    [Decline of the Caliphate ]   [ British Intervention ]   [Modern Nigeria ]   [The Caliphates in Modern Nigeria ]   [Ending it, Mending it or Re-inventing it? ]  British Intervention The story of British invasion is too well known to warrant recounting here. The resistance of the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno to this invasion is well documented in several published and unpublished works. While much has been said about the dilemma of the Wazir, referring the effort of Waziri Buhari through his Risalat al-Wazir ila ahl ilm wa al-Tadabbur, very little has been said about the dilemma of the British in having to deal with people who even though conquered physically refused to be subdued culturally and refused to be impressed by the infidel. The British themselves acknowledged a measure of cultural superiority of the members of the Caliphate. It must be added here, that since this invasion Sokoto and Borno ceased to be two separate entities and became one Islamic entity which were seen as one and approached as one not only by the British but also by its heir, modern Nigeria. The first dilemma the British faced seem to be that of legitimacy. They laboured to prove that the Caliphate came to exist as a result of Fulani conquest. They went ahead to show that what the Fulani got by conquest they have now lost by conquest. In the words of the architect of colonial Nigeria, Lord Lugard, "The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule, which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani took by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British." In the words of Last, several decades later, "The Northern states of Nigeria have in the past two hundred years experienced two great reform movements. Both were accompanied by conquest, by a distinct minority and both sought to impose an external universal culture with its set of written laws and distinct administration. The ideals and their application by the two groups have been strikingly similar." Western, particularly British, scholars continue to echo these views and made them the dominating perspective in the study of the Caliphate. To further justify their conquest they were desperate to show, on the one hand, how corrupt and unjust the Caliphate, or as they will prefer to put it , the Fulani rule was, and on the other hand how fair and benevolent the British rule was. While admittedly the Caliphate had degenerated in certain areas and in certain respects, it is only fair to expect the British and their scholars to exaggerate, for how else will they show their benevolence? The writings of M.G. Smith seem typical in this respect. Too often he describe the jihad as "invasion" and sometime as "revolt" and consistently tried to play the ethnic card, plying the Fulani against the Habe all in an effort to provoke aversion in his audience in the 60’s and 70’s. Writing on the what he calls the "Fulani Emirs" and "conquering aristocracies" and their treatment of the defeated "Habe", he said the latter were "systematically denied jural and political rights or relations of clientage and protection. They (the Habe) were never formally and categorically accepted or treated as Muslims. Differential taxation, corvee and Fulani monopoly of military political and jural resources were pervasive and uniform. Habe were identified with corporate disabilities in political, civil, religious and economic spheres, as a leaderless category, the subjected peoples likely to revolt and to be suppressed." Such insinuations in the name of academic work were to provide a basis for the Hausa-Fulani bashing by neighbouring ethnic groups who have fallen prey to such ruse. All this fraud unfortunately continues in our universities to this day. This became the intellectual foundation of a grand propaganda against the Caliphate. A great amount of the academic materials available in our libraries today are mere extensions of this fraud. The next dilemma is how to administer a people who nurse such deep resentment to infidel rule. While as much as possible they tried to carry the rulers they found and respect the traditions, they were quietly replacing the rulers that were clearly not giving the maximum co-operation with those who were more prepared to co-operate, or collaborate as it were. The colonial policy was not explicit but clearly they were weary about the more learned among the emirs and tended to replace them with the least learned, making it easier to carry their objectives further. So much has been said and written about the so-called indirect rule of the British. But I tend to agree more with Bishop Tugwell, who seem to be saying the right thing, albeit for the wrong reasons, when he observed that, "‘Indirect rule’ is direct rule by indirect means. The Emir’s position and salary are secure.... The Emir, he adds, who is appointed by the Government, is the instrument of the Resident, ...". It is in responding to this accusation that Lugard seem to have revealed what the so-called indirect rule was all about. In his words, "To overthrow an organisation, however faulty, which has the sanction of long usage, and is acquiesced in by the people, before any system could be created to take its place - before, indeed we had any precise knowledge of Moslem methods of native law and custom - would have been an act of folly which no sane administrator could attempt. The very necessity for avoiding precipitate action, and the knowledge that reform could only be effective, and enlist native co-operation, if it was gradual, made the responsibility more onerous." The next dilemma, it seems to me, is how to deal with the Caliphate. The process was so gradual and subtle that it was almost imperceptible but the effect was certainly discernible. The merger of 1914 may have been done for pure British convenient but it had the effect of diluting, some would say polluting the Caliphate. It seemed to have provided ample opportunity to restrict the application of the Sharia and now with the benefit of hindsight to put enduring obstacles to the expression of Islam in any way. But it was in the educational system they seem to have had most of their hope. As they were elbowing the ulama’ out of the system they were nurturing a new generation of western educated natives to take over. They had to first ensure that the new elite are taught very little about their own history and more on the benevolence of the British. Those of us who entered Primary school in the late 50’s finished our university education with being told a word about the Sokoto or Borno Caliphate. I can recall vividly how we were taught about Colombus and his discovery of America, the Spanish conquerors of Latin America and how Samuel Ajayi Crowder brought succour to the suffering Nigerian masses, but not a word about Shehu Usman, Abdullahi or Bello. When they started teaching the history of the Caliphate in the 70’s, a textbook used in Kano had the audacity to refer to the Shehu as a terrorist, and there was not as much as an eyebrow raised. The little we heard were through the attenuated oral tradition through blind men begging for alms or such people that were not usually taken seriously. It is in this educated elite who have been kept deliberately ignorant of the extent and worth of their real heritage that the job of dismantling the Caliphate was left. Admittedly the British seemed to have maintained a high respect for the Caliphate and made efforts to avoid injuring the sensibilities of Muslim. They created the House of Chiefs fashioned along the House of Lords and tried to carry the Caliphate as much as possible. But this may have well been part of the gimmick.

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