CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM RESPONSE
TO THE CHALLENGE OF KNOWLEDGE:
SEPARATING THE GRAIN FROM THE CHAFF - 5
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[Background ]
[ The Problem I ]
[ The Problem II ]
The Approach of the IIIT The International Institute of Islamic Thought
(IIIT) has in the last one and a half decade or so held several conferences and
published a corpus of material on the Islamization of knowledge.(23) This has
not only popularised the subject and recruited more people than ever before but
it has also raised great hopes and expectations. But for the purpose of our
analysis, one of this publications Islamization
of knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan is perhaps the most
important.(24) Couched in eloquent prose, the book makes for easy and pleasant
reading. It is very easy to share the concerns it raises but not the diagnosis,
much less the conclusions. The work does not appear to have been informed by
the earlier attempts of Iqbal, Nasr, Attas and Fazlur Rahman, and the attempt
to identify what it constantly refers to as the ‘malaise’, tends to be more
descriptive than analytical. The introduction on page xiii says that “ the plan
formulated by the Institute to tackle the crisis of thought in the Muslim world
has been based on the conviction that the crisis involves two dimensions: the
intellectual thought processes and the estrangement between the Ummah and its
legacy”. Chapter One which addresses the problem and tries to identify the
malaise of the Ummah, has three sections: A, the Malaise of the Ummah, which is
hardly one page and largely a catalogue of complaints of an Ummah which
“numbers over a billion people; that its territories are among the most vast
and the richest; and that its potential in human, material and geopolitical
[resourses] are the greatest ...”.(25) Section B commences on the following
page, and addresses ‘Major effects of the Malaise’ and contains a few
paragraphs each on ‘Political Character’, ‘Economic Character’, and ‘Cultural
Character’. The last section entitled
the ‘Core of the Crisis: the Malaise of Thought and Methodology’, similarly has
a few paragraphs on each of the issues addressed, ‘The Present State of
Education in the Muslim World’ and ‘Lack of Clear Vision’. Here again it seems
to be comprised of more complaints: “the colonialists devised a well-thought
out and well-planned strategy ... National independence gave the secularist
educational system its greatest boost ... today students are cynical lethargic
and mistrust all leaders”.(26) Under the entry on ‘lack of vision’ it observes,
“that teachers in Muslim universities do not possess the vision of Islam and,
therefore, are not driven by its cause is certainly the greatest calamity of
Muslim education”.(27) Perhaps, and even after agreeing with all the
observations, one will still ask what then is the problem? Admittedly, later in
the work there are numerous references to intellectual crisis and
methodological problems, but again it is difficult to pin down the problem, or
even the crisis much less its core. But failure to pin down the problem is not
as dangerous as mistaking the symptoms for the disease. The danger of mistaking
symptoms for the disease are too well known and the risks too great to be
ignored. Even if the disease has been established and
defined, we still need to go further and deeper to establish its aetiology if
we are to succeed at combating it, this is particularly so with diseases which
have over the years become deeply conceited and chronic. But here again the
attempt does not go deep enough. Mention is made of the Tartar invasion and the
Crusaders (p. 23) but then we are suddenly returned to the contemporary period
of Kamal Attartuk, (p. 24) a jump of centuries, all of which are crucial in the
aetiology of the malaise. True, the major ulama’, particularly the fuqaha, are
mentioned but again there doesn’t appear to be any attempt to capture the
complex atmosphere under which these methodologies were developed and the
intellectual challenges and methodological problems they had to contend with.
It thus leaves us uncertain and ill-informed about the genesis of the malaise
we wish to remedy. While the complaints tend to blame the West and some
veiled enemies of Islam for all the woes of the Muslim Ummah, the attempts to
assure Muslim readers of the capacity of the Ummah to tackle this crisis often,
if unwittingly, tend instead to idealise the Ummah. This tacit and perhaps
unconscious idealising is further worsened by an apparent reluctance to look at
the weaknesses of the Ummah especially those that are likely to pose serious
obstacles to any attempt at recovery. The dangers here are perhaps fairly
obvious. Idealising tends to conceal weaknesses that need to be considered for
the purpose of recovery; it also engenders oversimplification of the task ahead
and make people complacent in procuring provisions or to rest on their oars too
early, having been oblivious of the gravity of the task and having
underestimated the journey. It also tends to raise high and early
expectations giving room for early
disappointment. Chapter Five of the work plan, entitled, ‘Agenda of
the Institute’, after listing an eight point agenda, proceeds to expound on the
stages of the agenda under seven headings. In an earlier paper produced by him
at 1982 conference, Faruqi presented the same idea under Section V, ‘The Work
Plan’; there, however, five objectives were itemised and 12 steps
identified.(28) The latter makes for easier reading while the former is far
less precise and rather cumbersome. The first objective in the work plan, for
example reads “to create awareness in the Ummah of the crisis of ideas. This
involves enlightening the Ummah about the place and methodology of the crisis
of Islamic thought in the perspective of its cultural and civilisational
existence.” The first objective in Faruqi’s paper reads, “to master the modern
disciplines.” Similarly the steps as expounded in both documents, even when
they make easy reading, will nevertheless leave the reader wondering what
precisely is intended or how exactly it is to be carried out. The steps
(whether seven or 12) taken together, from the mastery of modern disciplines to
the mastery of Islamic legacy, then a
critique of both and a recommendation for the rewriting of modern disciplines
along Islamic lines which are then disseminated through the writing of
textbooks, reads very much like a dream. Mastering the Islamic legacy may be
easy to understand, but how do we really master the modern disciplines? The
document does not elaborate upon this, but the impression one gets is that it
is as easy as going to a university ( a Western one I suppose) to obtain a
doctorate, but certainly this is not mastery of the discipline. So where does
the mastery begin? This looks like a gross oversimplification of a very arduous
and tedious process which may spread over half a century or so, for before one
can hope to master a subject one has to first walk ones way to the frontiers of
the discipline. This requires such levels of seriousness, dedication and
resources that are simply not on the ground for now. In setting out the “agenda objectives” the Work Plan
has the sagacity to appreciate that “its success does not exclusively depend on
the efforts of the Institute” and has therefore invited “every sincere Muslim,
indeed, all concerned Islamic organisations struggling to re-establish Islamic
order and civilisation” to partake in this “plan for Islamising Knowledge; for
reforming the contemporary mode of Islamic thought; for reviving its
methodology; and for restoring its dynamic originality, creativity and
ability”.(29) Some Muslim individuals and institutions have since responded. A
university in Nigeria, for example, recruited a substantial number of graduate
assistants for the purpose, but it is difficult to see how someone just
grappling to understand the subject itself, much less master it, could Islamise
it. Where the Islamization of the disciplines has begun, it has already gone to
the ridiculous level of Islamising the English language. One is not sure why
English has been chosen for Islamization or how that is going to be done or
which language will follow next, perhaps English, French, then German, Russian,
Chinese ...? It is amazing how the obvious link between language and society
can be so recklessly ignored. Even al-Attas who feels very strongly about
languages will not encourage this futility, for he knows only too well that
language is nothing but an expression of the culture and world view of a
people. As he once observed, “language, thought and reason are closely
interconnected and are indeed interdependent in projecting to man his world
view or vision of reality”.(30) The IIIT cannot be held responsible for what
people make of their objectives; Taha Jabir, a, if not the, leading figure,
makes this very clear in a recent paper.(31) But the significance of this
paper, which appears to be an update to the Work Plan, is in clarifying the
contemporaneous and experimental nature of the scheme, stripping it of what
ever finality some may have inferred on it. The Islamization of knowledge
school, as he calls it, “is keenly aware of the workings of time on ideas as
they pass from stage to stage and mature, and is therefore the first to point
out that the “Islamization of knowledge” is not to be understood as a set of
axioms, or a rigid ideology or a religious movement”.(32) In fact, he went
further by inviting people to make contributions that can enrich this idea. One
cannot agree more, but it is by criticism that ideas are enriched and not by
praise. In fact it seems necessary to re-examine the whole idea of the
Islamization of knowledge not only to separate the chaff from the grain, as it
were, but also to put the challenge in perspective. It is in this light, that a
few issues are being raised below, for what they are worth.
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