HAJJ AND THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT:
TOWARDS A CLEAR AND SUSTAINABLE POLICY ON HAJJ-3

[ Preamble ]    [Hajj in West African History]   [Hajj and European Imperialism ]    [Hajj Policy in Independent Nigeria ]   [Towards a Clear and Sustainable Policy ]    [Concluding Remarks & References ]  Hajj and European Imperialism It must first be appreciated that European imperialists were not here for reasons of pure Philanthropy, as Lord Lugard himself admitted in his book, The Dual Mandate. They were here primarily to help themselves and had no qualms about it. However, the British experience with Ahmad Muhammad al-Mahdi in the Sudan, in the 1880’s and the French with Hajj Umar al-Futi earlier in the Sene-Gambia, in the 1850’s, had made the imperialist scared stiff of Islam. They had the greatest opposition from Muslims who fought them in battle fields with such valour as they had never seen before and continued to resist them ideologically even when they were physically overcome. In fact, after the British had overpowered the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, the reigning Sultan, Attahiru, after due consultation with his council, decided to make hijra to the east rather than live under the British colonial administration. The British felt too insecure to allow him and his teeming followers and pursued them until they killed him and many of his supporters in Burmi, near Gombe. Even after the death of Attahiru, the hijra to the east continued, if discreetly, and the British could still not find the peace of mind they sought, rather they were now hunted not only by the ghost of the Mahdi, Umar al-Futi and his tijaniyya fraternity, but also the ghost of Attahiru and his followers who seemed to have increased after the battle of Burmi. Thus British colonisation began with a phobia for Islam and went into alliance, subtle as this alliance had to be, with an otherwise strange bedfellow, Christian missionary institutions. The two are strange bedfellows back at home, for the Church had long been divorced from the state and the average British had very little to do with Christianity, as a colonial officer admitted, the typical British Christian would go to church on Sunday only if it was too wet to play golf.(12) Christianity became, inadvertent as it may seem, the spiritual wing of colonialism, often going ahead of the colonial army, providing intelligence information and softening the soil by impressing on the new converts the superiority of the white man and his culture. The colonial administration on the other hand, provided the missions with protection, privileges and grants from the coffers of the colonial government. Hajj, which involved the movement of people to the east, through the land of the Mahdi and back, was for the colonial officers, therefore, a serious business, a potential source of unlimited threat to their precarious hold on power. They thus had to develop their own policy on hajj, mainly for the survival of their colonial enterprise. The first phase of this policy consisted of stemming the tide of movement of people, especially eastwards. After the death of Attahiru at the battle of Burmi, what remained of his people proceeded with their hijra to the east until they reached the Sudan where they settled at the bank of the blue Nile, a placed they named Mai-Wurno. There after the movement to the east may have increased for the colonial administration were all too worried about movement especially around Burmi area itself. Every effort was made to restrict the movement of people, Said b. Hayatu, the only surviving son of Hayatu b. Said who swore allegiance and tried to migrate to the Mahdi in the Sudan, was exiled to Cameroon. Special surveillance was mounted around Bima hill in Bauchi which seemed to have continued well into the thirties. A report addressed to the Resident in Bauchi by the District Officer, Gombe division, gave details of such surveillance.(13) But this did not appear to work. About mid-twenties, restriction on movement having proved untenable, the focus shifted to monitoring movement not only within the colony but beyond even as far as Hijaz itself. This change appeared to have been spurred by the British imperial government itself, for a letter from Downing street dated March 10, 1927 suggests the government was quite uneasy over this issue. The letter read in part, " I should be glad if you would have a memorandum prepared preferably, if possible, by Mr. Palmer or Mr. Lethem, setting out the situation as it is at present, and, in particular, stating whether there is any reason for apprehension at the present time that an insurrectionary movement could gather force in Nigeria from which it might possibly extend eastwards as far as the Egyptian frontier."(14) The letter itself referred to Sir Hugh Clifford’s confidential despatch of 11th March 1924. It appeared that soon after this despatch, early in the following year, 1925, Mr. G. J. Lethem was commissioned to undertake an extensive tour of all the pilgrim settlement along the route as far as Hijaz itself and examine the current and potential threats of the hajj to the colonial administration and make recommendations. By 1927, Lethem had completed his assignment and had compiled a 400 page report on the matter. This report, in the words of its author, "is confined as far as possible to the question of the part played by the pilgrim traffic and the settlement of West Africans in the east arising from this traffic in the dissemination, actual or potential, of the religious or political influences of the east in the Nigerian emirates ...... The are other subjects of importance such as the pilgrimage itself, the pilgrim labour on the cotton-fields of the Sudan, the increase in permanent settlement in the Sudan .... " The thrusts of Lethem’s recommendation appears to be a much closer surveillance on the pilgrims both within the colony, along the route and at their various settlements, until they could find a way of controlling the whole pilgrimage itself. For this he suggested that it would be necessary to co-ordinate with French and such other intelligence services on the ground. in his words again: "I have included in an appendix certain suggested recommendations for action in regard to matters touched in this report ; these may be summarised as follows: A. Improvement of the arrangement concerning the pilgrimage to facilitate a quick journey to Mecca and return. A separate memoranda is being submitted. B. Co-ordination of intelligence work as regards channel of propaganda to Nigeria with the proper agencies in other parts of Africa, in particular to secure systematic attention to the following:- i. The takarir circles in the Hejaz, and such personalities as Alfa Hashim, Mohammad Bunu, etc. ii The small takarir community in Cairo .... iii. The Takarir generally in the Sudan, Personalities and tendencies observed etc. through the Sudan intelligence department"(15)   Later, about late thirties, the colonial administration realised that it would be far more effective if they could arrange the pilgrimage themselves. In 1936, Mr. G. S. Browne, the then chief commissioner of Northern provinces, discussed and obtained quotation from a British shipping company, Elder Dempster Line Ltd, for Lagos-Jeddah by sea, which turned out to be some 42 pounds sterling. With other costs included the whole expenses turned out to be some 90 or 100 pounds sterling. Mr. Browne also explored the air route and seemed to have been doing this with the consultation of the emirs, for he reported that he later consented to the air route on the strength of the advise of Sarkin Katsina.(16) It did not appear that the colonial administration ever succeeded in organising the pilgrimage as they had hoped, but it was clear that they had planned to do so, to acquire a firm grip of hajj, and for once have some sleep. The policy of the British colonial administration on hajj, therefore, first centred on the control of the movement of people and when this proved impossible they settled at monitoring the movement of people not only in and out of the region but even their settlements along the hajj routes. Later they realised that it was even better for them to organise the hajj themselves as it will give them a better control of a phenomena that has made them lost so much sleep. After the second World War, which took a heavy toll not only on European men and equipment but also on European prestige and mystique, the whole colonial posture, however, had to change. The image of European Imperialism was severely dented and they knew too well that they cannot hold on for too long. The independence struggle began in earnest and the British, perhaps more than the French, knew that they had to leave eventually. They did not have much time for hajj, as they were busy working out how best to secure their interest even after they would have gone. Control of the colonised people can no longer be direct and perhaps needed not to be, not only because they have raised enough natives to do that which they previously had to do themselves, but also because it has to be more subtle and sophisticated.